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SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION-TOWARD A
NEW HARDSHIP STANDARD
In order to obtain suspension of deportation, a deportable alien
must demonstrate that he willface extreme hardship if ordered to
leave the United States. The Supreme Court's latest decision in-
terpreting the "extreme hardship" standard, INS v. Wang, unfor-
tunately raises more questions then it answers. This Comment
traces the development of the "extreme hardship" standard in
congressional legislation and recent judicial decisions. The Com-
ment concludes with several recommendations for amendment of
the existing suspension of deportation statute.
INTRODUCTION
For an estimated four to five million undocumented aliens in
the United States,' suspension of deportation is one of the few
procedures available to become a lawful permanent resident.2
Suspension of deportation has been heralded as a landmark of
amelioration in immigration law 3 This provision affords relief to
undocumented aliens who are long time residents of the United
States with close ties to the nation.4 By means of suspension of
deportation, tragic hardships that often accompany deportation
can be avoided.
There exists, however, an almost insurmountable barrier to ob-
1. AMzRIcAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC PoLIcY RESEARCH, ILLEGAL
ALIENS: PROBLEMS AND PoucIEs 1 (1978). Since 1920 nearly ten million undocu-
mented aliens have been apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). The number of undocumented aliens in the U.S. are estimated to
be as high as ten million. Id.
2. The Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976) [herein-
after cited as L & N. Act].
3. Gordon, Discretionary Relieffrom Deportation, DECALOGUE J., Sept.-Oct.,
1960, at 6.
4. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 596 (1950). See generally Comment,
Suspension of Deportation-A Look at the Benevolent Aspects of the McCarran-
Walter Act, 61 MicH. L. REV. 352 (1962).
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taining suspension;5 an alien must prove that his deportation
would be an "extreme hardship" to himself or to his United
States citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent or child.6
Strict application of the extreme hardship standard has led to
harsh and inequitable results.7 This Comment will trace the de-
velopment of the extreme hardship standard, analyze recent judi-
cial decisions on the standard, and offer legislative proposals for a
new, more appropriate hardship standard.
EXTREME HARDSHIP: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Prior to 1940, no provision for suspension of deportation ex-
isted.8 All undocumented aliens apprehended had to be de-
ported.9 The severe hardships resulting from the inflexibility of
the law prompted the INS to press for new legislation. Although
5. Bills to Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Na-
tionality: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm.'s of the Comm. on the Judiciary
Congress of the United States, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 589 (1951) (statement of Simon
H. Rifkind). For a discussion of the difficulties in obtaining suspension of deporta-
tion relief in general, see Comment, Suspension of Deportatior Illusory Relief, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 229 (1976).
6. I. & N. Act, § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976). Under § 244(a) there are two
different hardship standards. Section 244(a) (2) requires a showing of "excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship" for aliens deportable on the following
grounds: L & N. Act, § 241(1) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1976) (convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude); id. § 241(a) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (5) (failure to notify
Attorney General of current address); id. § 241(a) (6), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (6) (anar-
chists); id. § 241(a) (7), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (7) (aliens involved in espionage, sabo-
tage or other activities prejudicial to public interest); id. § 241(a) (11), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(11) (drug addicts and alcoholics); id. § 241(a) (12), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (12)
(aliens involved in prostitution); id. § 241(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (14) (convicted
of possession of an illegal weapon); id. § 241(a) (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(15) (con-
victed of violating Title I of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 within five years of
entry); id. § 241(a) (16), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (16) (convicted more than once of violat-
ing Title I of the Alien Registration Act of 1940); id. § 241(a) (17), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (17) (an alien the Attorney General finds to be an undesirable resident for
violation of certain federal laws); or id. § 241(a) (18), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(18) (im-
porting an alien into the United States for an immoral purpose). Aliens deport-
able under any other grounds need "only" show "extreme hardship."
Except where otherwise specified, "extreme hardship" will be used to refer to
both hardship standards. An alien's "spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of
the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resident," L & N.
Act, § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976), will be referred to hereinafter as an imme-
diate relative.
7. See, e.g., Chokloikaew v. INS, 601 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1979) (suspension de-
nied despite loss in liquidating business investments and possible prison term on
return); Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979) (hardship to ten year old citizen
if mother deported not extreme); Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960)
(alien with 17 years residency denied suspension).
8. 2 C. GORDON & IL ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE § 7.1a, at
7-5 (rev. ed. 1980).
9. Id. The INS, however, stayed the deportation of many apprehended aliens
notwithstanding its lack of statutory authority. Gordon, Discretionary Relief From
Deportation, DECALOGUE J., September-October, 1960, at 6.
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suggestions for legislative change had been made as early as 1934,
it was not until six years later that Congress acted.'0
The Alien Registration Act of 194011 allowed for suspension of
deportation where an alien or his family would suffer "serious ec-
onomic detriment" if the alien were deported.12 The Act met with
widespread approval.13 By an amendment in 1948,14 aliens with
seven years residence in the United States became eligible for
suspension regardless of family ties. Congress clearly intended to
assuage the heavy personal burdens in a wide range of deporta-
tion cases.15
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) liberally interpreted
the "serious economic detriment" standard.16 The BIA found that
"[s]erious economic detriment exists if the effect of deportation
would be substantially to lower the standard of living of the de-
pendent relative."'7 Thus, an alien could often receive suspension
by showing deportation would significantly reduce his future
earning capacity.'8 Unfortunately, the generous provisions of the
10. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 596 (1950).
11. Ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 672 (1940) (amending the Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19(c), 39 Stat. 874 (1917)).
12. Specifically, the Act provided that:
In the case of any alien... who is deportable under any law of the United
States [except certain aggravated grounds] and who has proved good
moral character for the preceding five years, the Attorney General may
... suspend deportation of such alien... if he finds that such deporta-
tion would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resi-
dent alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable
alien ....
Id.
13. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, ILxnwGRATIoN LAW AND PROCEDURE §
7.1a, at 7-6 (rev. ed. 1980).
14. Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206 (1948) (amending the Alien Regis-
tration Act, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 672 (1940)). The amendment was intended to ex-
pand eligibility for relief to aliens with no close family ties in the United States.
These aliens were not eligible under the Allen Registration Act as originally
drafted. S. REP. No. 1204, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1948). The amendment also elimi-
nated previous racial bars. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 596 (1950).
15. See Gagliano v. INS, 353 F.2d 922, 927 (2d Cir. 1965).
16. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 597 (1950).
17. Id. See, e.g., In re T, 3 L & N. Dec. 707 (1949); In re L, 2 L & N. Dec. 775
(1947); In re W, 2 L & N. Dec. 679 (1946); In re B, 2 L & N. Dec. 627 (1946).
18. Contra De Reynoso v. INS, 627 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1980); Llacer v. INS, 388
F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1968). The liberal interpretation of the standard is perhaps best
demonstrated in a case involving an alien mother entirely dependent on public
assistance. The BIA noted the care she provided to her children had an economic
value. Suspension was granted on the basis that loss of her care would be a seri-
ous economic detriment to her children. BIA file 55930/355 (March 31, 1943).
Alien Registration Act were not long-lived.
Suspension of deportation came under heavy attack in the early
fifties as Congress contemplated a major revision of the immigra-
tion and nationality laws.' 9 Most criticism centered around two
themes. First, it was claimed that suspension was being used to
bypass normal immigration channels. Reports indicated aliens
were entering the United States on temporary transit visas and
obtaining suspension of deportation by claiming serious economic
detriment to citizen children born shortly after the parents had
arrived.20 Second, it was argued that suspension was unfair to
aliens attempting to immigrate by conventional means, since the
number of visas available was reduced by each alien granted sus-
pension.21 Congress concluded that the "serious economic detri-
ment" standard had to be changed to end the alleged "flouting" of
the immigration system.22
In 1952, Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act.23 This legis-
lation marked a complete overhaul of the existing immigration
laws.24 Eligibility for suspension of deportation was severely re-
stricted.25 Section 244(a) of the Act,26 which outlined the new
provisions for suspension, required that an alien show "excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship" to himself or an immedi-
ate relative. This hardship standard was even more harsh than
the "extreme and unusual" hardship standard recommended by
the Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary.27 Section 244(a) left
one with the impression that very few deportable aliens would re-
ceive suspension relief in the future.
The new suspension provisions incorporated a strange mixture
of flexibility and rigidity. The standard for hardship was not to be
19. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952); S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 600-01 (1950).
20. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 600-01 (1950).
21. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952).
22. Id.
.23. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1557 (1976)). This act,
with various amendments, remains the basis of United States Immigration and
Nationality Law.
24. THE IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GuiLD, IMMIGRATION
LAw AND DEFENSE § 2.5 (2d ed. 1979).
25. 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9(a),
at 7-130 to 7-131, (rev. ed. 1980). See Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Pro-
posals for Reform, 56 COLUm. L. REV. 309, 342-43 (1956).
26. MCCARRAN-WALTER ACT, CH. 5, § 244(a), 66 STAT. 214 (1952) (current ver-
sion at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976)). In addition to the requisite hardship, an alien
had to show "good moral character" and a continuous period of residency for
either five, seven or ten years, depending on the seriousness of the deportation
grounds. In the McCarran-Walter Act, the "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" standard applied to all of the deportation grounds. Id.
27. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 610 (1950).
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broadly interpreted. 28 The Attorney General's ability to grant re-
lief was limited because he could only consider those aliens dem-
onstrating sufficient hardship. His discretion to deny relief to an
eligible alien, however, was expanded.29 For the first time, the
suspension statute provided that the Attorney General "may, in
his discretion" suspend deportation. 30
The "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship standard
drew severe criticism. 31 Commentators found section 244 to be
complicated, confusing, and poorly drafted.32 The suspension
statute was described as "cruel and vindicative, heedless of the
opinions or good will of our allies, and oblivious of the standards
of decency and fair play that mark our criminal legislation." 33
Commenting on the "exceptional and extremely unusual" hard-
28. A Senate report explaine&
The committee is aware that in almost all cases of deportation, hardship
and frequently unusual hardship is experienced by the alien or the mem-
bers of his family who may be separated from the alien .... [U]nder the
bill, to justify the suspension of deportation the hardship must not only be
unusual but must also be exceptionally and extremely unusual. The bill
accordingly establishes a policy that the administrative remedy should be
available only in the very limited category of cases in which the deporta-
tion of the alien would be unconscionable.
S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
29. In theory, a hearing on suspension of deportation is a two step process.
First eligibility for relief is determined, and then discretion is exercised in decid-
ing if relief will be granted. In practice, both determinations tend to merge. For
example, eligibility is often assumed and relief is denied for lack of equities favor-
ing a grant of suspension.
30. McCarran-Walter Act, ch. 5, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 214 (1952) (current version at
8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976)). The Attorney General has authority to administer and
enforce the immigrations laws. However, he has delegated his authority to a vari-
ety of officers in the INS, e.g., immigration judges. C. GORDON & E. GORDON, IMMI-
GRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.5b, at 1-7, § 3.17b at 3-55 (desk ed. 1980). For the
purposes of this article, "Attorney General" will be used to refer to anyone with
delegated authority from the Attorney General.
31. Both President Truman and President Eisenhower were critical of the new
hardship standard. President Truman, in his veto of the Act of 1952, expressed
fear that section 244 "would narrow the circle of those who can obtain relief. ...
This, he felt, would be unfortunate since other sections of the Act of 1952 would
impose harsher restrictions and add to the number deserving relief. M.R. Doc.
No. 520, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952). In a letter to Senator Arthur Watkins, Presi-
dent Eisenhower stated that there would be problems interpreting the exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship standard, and therefore, "the laws should more
clearly state the standards upon which this discretionary relief may be granted by
the Attorney General." 99 CONG. REc. 4321 (1953).
32. Comment, Suspension of Deportation-A Look at the Benevolent Aspect of
the McCarran-Walter Act, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 352, 355 (1962).
33. Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM.
L. REV. 309, 309 (1956).
ship standard, Louis Jaffe, Professor of Administrative Law at
Harvard, stated that "[r] arely has there been a balder statement
of a national purpose to be cruel."34
In 1962, an amendment to section 244(a) (1) changed the word-
ing "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship to "extreme"
hardship.35 The old hardship standard was retained in section
244(a) (2) for suspension when aggravated grounds for deporta-
tion exist.3 6 Reasons and justifications for the amendment were
not elucidated.37 The BIA interpreted the amendment as a con-
gressional attempt to lessen the degree of hardship required for
suspension.38
Legislators have considered the hardship standard at length.
Congress has been responsive to criticism of section 244. Barring
the changes in 1952, the suspension statute has followed a trend
expanding eligibility for relief. But have these changes resulted
34. Staff of President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, 82d.
Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings Before the President's Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization 1576 (Comm. Print 1952).
By far the harshest criticism of the new hardship standard came from Ben
Touster, President of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society:
[S]ection 244 [along with §§ 212(c), 245] . . .rob our immigration laws of
every vestige of humaneness which has developed since 1917. The hard-
ship attendant upon separating families is not enough to grant suspen-
sion.... One must measure degrees of suffering and torture, and only
those who suffer the anxiety of mental and physical pain to the utmost
may be relieved under this law. The rest must suffer exile, a dreadful
punishment abandoned by the common consent of all civilized peoples.
Id. at 1789.
35. Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247 (1962).
36. Id. See note 6 supra.
37. The bill, which included the amendment to the hardship standard, was
simply described as one "to facilitate the entry of alien skilled specialists and cer-
tain relatives of U.S. citizens, and for other purposes... ." IR REP. No. 2552,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1962). A 1955 report by a special subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary provides a possible explanation for the 1962 amendment.
The subcommittee concluded that section 244(a) did not realistically address the
problems it was designed to handle. There had been a dramatic increase in pri-
vate immigration bills, which were a heavy burden on Congress. The liberal atti-
tude the BIA had taken in interpreting the exceptional and extremely unusual
standard had not been adequate in reducing private legislation. In order to "elimi-
nate sources of hardship which the Congress is being repeatedly called upon to
alleviate through the enactment of private legislation," the subcommittee sug-
gested that a new standard of hardship-extreme hardship-be adopted for sus-
pension of deportation. SPECIAL SuaconimrrTIE OF THE COMM1IEE ON THE
JuDIcIARY, APPENDIX REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NA-
TIoNALIrY ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1570, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-35 (1955). Private immi-
gration bills are a last ditch effort to stave off deportation when all administrative
and judicial action have failed. Such a bill, if enacted by Congress, is a legislative
mandate that must be followed by administrative authorities. C. GORDON & E.
GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAw § 7.10, at 7-32 to 7-33 (student ed.
1980).
38. See In re Hwang, 10 L & N. Dec. 448 (1964); In re Louie, 10 L & N. Dec. 223
(1963).
668
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in a more liberal application of the law? The role of discretion is
an unpredictable factor in suspension of deportation relief.
THE RoLE OF DISCRETION
The Attorney General has considerable discretion to determine
when an applicant has satisfied the broad "extreme hardship"
standard. The relationship between discretion and the hardship
standard has been an important element in recent judicial deci-
sions on eligibility for suspension.3 9 Discretion plays a role in
three areas of the suspension procedure: (1) in ruling on a mo-
tion to reopen a deportation hearing in order to apply for suspen-
sion;40 (2) in determining whether an alien meets eligibility
requirements for relief;41 (3) in deciding whether an eligible alien
should be granted suspension.42
If an alien has been found deportable, a motion to reopen de-
portation proceedings is appropriate when new circumstances
arise affecting his eligibility for suspension. For example, assume
an alien granted voluntary departure43 has a child born in the
United States before he leaves. In the past, if an alien demon-
strated new material facts sufficient for a prima facie case of eligi-
bility, the Attorney General had to grant the motion.4 4 Denial of a
motion to reopen when an alien had established a prima facie
case of eligibility was considered an abuse of discretion. 45
In INS v. Wang,46 the Supreme Court held that the Code of
Federal Regulations "does not affirmatively require the Board [of
Immigration Appeals] to reopen the proceedings under any par-
39. INS v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027 (1981); Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980);
Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1979).
40. INS v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027 (1981).
41. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 7.1b, at 7-10, § 8.14, at 8-124 (rev. ed. 1980).
42. See United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77
(1957); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 353 (1956); Asimakopoulos v. INS, 445 F.2d 1362,
1365 (9th Cir. 1971).
43. Voluntary departure allows an alien to leave before a final order of expul-
sion is issued. This allows him to choose where he will go after leaving the United
States and it avoids the bar to reentry that deported aliens face. C. GORDON & E.
GORDON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.2a, at 7-6 (desk ed. 1980).
44. Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd per curiam, 101 S. Ct.
1027 (1981).
45. Jong Shik Choe v. INS, 597 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1979); Urbano de
Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1978).
46. 101 S. Ct. 1027 (1981).
ticular condition."47 The per curiam decision in Wang leaves
some questions unanswered regarding motions to reopen. Can
denial of a motion to reopen be reviewed for abuse of discretion?
The Wang decision implies that such a denial is not subject to re-
view. Yet the Supreme Court had previously held in Giova v. Ro-
senberg4 8 that the circuit courts have jurisdiction to review a
motion to reopen.49
The confusion in Wang undoubtedly results from the Court's
cursory treatment of the issues involved. The case was decided
without oral argument or full legal briefs. It is difficult to predict
what standard of review the circuit courts will apply for motions
to reopen after Wang. Until the Supreme Court clarifies its
stance, the circuit courts will presumably defer to the judgment of
the BIA on motions to reopen.
The precise role of discretion in determining eligibility for sus-
pension is unclear. The process of determining eligibility for sus-
pension has been alternately described as a question of fact0 and
as a discretionary decision.5 1 In Wong Wing Hang v. INS,52 the
landmark case on discretion and suspension of deportation, the
court stated:
[A] dministrative findings of fact made in determining an alien's eligibility
for suspension must meet the statutory test of support by 'reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole
[the substantial evidence standard]'. . . [and] that a determination of in-
eligibility is subject to judicial scrutiny for proper application of the condi-
tions prescribed in § 244. 5 3
Yet in Banks v. INS,54 the court states that "[i]n reviewing the
finding that Banks has failed to establish extreme hardship, this
court may overturn the administrative determination only if we
find that there has been an abuse of discretion." 55
The majority of decisions follow Wong Wing Hang.5 6
"[NJeither the Service [INS] nor the Attorney General has any
47. Id. at 1031 n.5. The Attorney General has delegated power to review deci-
sions by immigration judges under § 244 to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See
note 30 supra.
48. 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (per curiam).
49. See Note, 42 N.Y.U. I. REV. 1155, 1162 (1967).
50. 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMIGRATioN LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.1b, at
7-10, § 8.14, at 8-124 (rev. ed. 1980).
51. Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979).
52. 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966).
53. Id. at 717. See I. & N. Act, § 106(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (a) (4) (1976).
54. 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 762.
56. See Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 228-29 (1963); Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 429
(9th Cir. 1980); Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794, 797 (3d Cir. 1980); Yui Sing Tse v. INS,
596 F.2d 831, 834 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979); Lee v. INS, 541 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1976);
Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.3 (9th Cir. 1968). But see Davidson v. INS, 558
F.2d 1361, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1977).
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discretion to exercise until the applicant clears the eligibility hur-
dle. Accordingly, the abuse of discretion standard is not appro-
priate in reviewing eligibility; the proper test is the substantial
evidence standard."57 Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for a
unanimous court in Foti v. INS,58 stated that "[s]ince a special in-
quiry officer cannot exercise his discretion to suspend deportation
until he finds the alien statutorily eligible for suspension, a find-
ing of eligibility and an exercise of (or refusal to exercise) discre-
tion may properly be considered as distinct and separate
matters."59 If the determination of extreme hardship is discre-
tionary, the exercise of discretion in the second step becomes
meaningless. There may be some overlap in the two step pro-
cess. 60 A finding of no extreme hardship may reflect a belief that
the alien, even if eligible, does not merit discretionary relief.
Such a short cut in the two step process makes it difficult to de-
termine whether discretion has been exercised. What was in real-
ity a discretionary decision may be treated as a finding of fact on
review.
Appellate review is further complicated by the practice of
pretermitting eligibility in a discretionary denial of suspension.6e
The Code of Federal Regulations requires "a discussion [written
or oral] of the evidence pertinent to any application made by re-
spondent . . . and the reasons for granting or denying the re-
quest" for suspension.62 The immigration judge is not required to
discuss the alien's eligibility for suspension.63 Section 244 should
be amended to require a full hearing on eligibility for suspension.
A written report should also be required discussing findings on
57. Lee v. INS, 541 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1976).
58. 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
59. Id. at 229 n.15.
60. C. GORDON & E. GORDON, IMnGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9e, at 7-34
(desk ed. 1980).
61. It has been suggested that "[b]ecause the determination of his [the
alien's] statutory eligibility for relief is a matter of right, it seems likely that the
applicant has a corollary right to a full and fair hearing on the statutory prerequi-
sites." 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, bMUvIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.1b, at
7-12 (rev. ed. 1980). See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 353 (1956); Silva v. Carter, 326
F.2d 315, 320 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964). Yet the Supreme
Court has approved the practice of pretermitting eligibility When denying suspen-
sion. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976) (reversing Third Circuit holding
that there must be a specific ruling on an applicant's eligibility).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 242.18(a) (1980).
63. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 26 (1976).
eligibility and reasons for granting or denying relief.64 This
change will assure an adequate record for review.
The Wang decision will not necessarily affect the standard of
review for administrative findings on suspension eligibility. In
Foti the Supreme Court held that the circuit courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review a finding of ineligibility for suspension.
The Court noted that Congress had placed jurisdiction for review
in the circuit courts because "the setting aside of an administra-
tive determination on the ground of arbitrariness involves dis-
puted eligibility questions and matters of statutory
construction." 65 Yet the Wang decision states that "the [Immi-
gration and Nationality] Act commits... definition [of the words
"extreme hardship"] in the first instance to the Attorney General
and his delegates, and their construction and application of this
standard should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply
because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute."66
There is no indication that the Supreme Court intended to over-
rule Foti in Wang.67 Therefore, the language in Wang can be rea-
sonably interpreted as limited to the particular fact situation in
that case: the Ninth Circuit Court had reversed a denial of a mo-
tion to reopen, even though the deportable alien had not sup-
ported his claim of hardship with affidavits or other evidentiary
materials. 68 If the circuit courts must defer to the Attorney Gen-
eral's interpretation of the suspension statute, it is difficult to im-
agine what function review of his decision would serve.
In addition to establishing eligibility, an alien must demon-
strate significant equities justifying a favorable exercise of discre-
64. See the "Recommendations for Legislative Change" section of this Com-
ment. The Code of Federal Regulations has in the past required such a written
decision. 8 C.F.R. § 242.61(a) (1952).
65. Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 230 (1963).
66. INS v. Jong Ha Wang 101 S. Ct. 1027, 1031 (1981).
67. In fact, Foti is cited as authority in Wang. INS v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027 n.1
(1981).
68. Id. at 1030. In the short Wang opinion, the Court refers eighteen times to
motions to reopen. Not once does the Court refer to appellate review of a discre-
tionary denial of suspension. The Court quotes with approval Circuit Judge Wal-
lace's dissent in Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1362 (9th Cir. 1980) (en bane):
If INS discretion is to mean anything, it must be that the INS has some
latitude in deciding when to reopen a case. The INS should have the right
to be restrictive. Granting such motions too freely will permit endless de-
lay of deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously
produce new and material facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
INS v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027, 1031 n.5 (1981). The Supreme Court was particularly
concerned about use of the motion to reopen merely to delay deportation. The
Wangs' deportation hearing had been reopened twice. INS v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027
(1981). Review of a denial of suspension does not pose the same danger of need-
less delay. Denial of suspension relief may only be reviewed once. See Foti v.
INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
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tion.69 Congress provided no guidelines for determining who
among eligible aliens should be granted relief. The Attorney Gen-
eral is not necessarily bound by previous cases involving aliens
with similar hardships, even though typically each "precedent"
will be given weight.70 When appealing denial of suspension to an
eligible alien, the following discussion in Wong Wing Hang
should be emphasized:
Without essaying comprehensive definition, we think the denial of suspen-
sion to an eligible alien would be an abuse of discretion if it were made
without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established
policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as an invidious discrim-
ination against a particular race or group, or, in Judge Learned Hand's
words, on other 'considerations that Congress could not have intended to
make relevant. 71
Discretion has been a central concern in recent circuit court de-
cisions expanding eligibility for suspension of deportation. These
decisions have increased the Attorney General's authority as to
who may be considered for relief, while his discretion to deny re-
lief has been limited. The Supreme Court's recent Wang ruling
places these circuit court decisions in question. Nevertheless,
Wang appears to be limited to motions to reopen involving claims
of economic hardship. Recent circuit court decisions expanding
the range of emotional hardships considered on review may yet
survive Wang.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "EXTREmE HARDSHIP"
There are no statutory guidelines for determining when ex-
treme hardship has been established. Therefore, the courts them-
selves have developed a number of factors to consider in
determining extreme hardship. These factors involve both emo-
tional and economic hardship, although rarely does any factor fall
neatly into either category.72
69. Asikese v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Comment, Suspension
of Deportation-A Look at the Benevolent Aspect of the McCarran-Walter Act, 61
MICH. L. REV. 352, 355 (1962).
70. Smith ex rel. Leung Sing v. Nicolls, 113 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1953) (de-
cided under the Alien Registration Act).
71. 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1965).
72. For example, the BIA used the following criteria for "exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual" hardship: "(a) length of residence in the United States .....
(b) family ties. . . . ,(c) possibility of obtaining a visa abroad. . . . ,(d) financial
burden on alien having to go abroad to obtain a visa. . . . , and (e) the health and
age of the alien." In re S, 5 I. & N. Dec. 409,410-11 (1953). The Ninth Circuit, in the
past, has considered a variety of factors in determining extreme hardship; e.g.,
After adoption of the Immigration and Nationality Act,73 eco-
nomic hardship, even in the extreme, was no longer by itself suffi-
cient for suspension.7 4 Economic hardship, however, remained an
element to be considered along with other factors.75 One eco-
nomic hardship in particular has been shown to carry weight with
the courts. If it is probable that an alien would not find any em-
ployment if deported, the extreme hardship requirement may be
satisfied.76 Courts give little consideration, however, to the hard-
ship of being deported to a country with a lower standard of liv-
ing.77 Such hardship is often insubstantial. Nevertheless, where
the differential in living standards is dramatic, the well-being of
an alien or his family may be seriously threatened. Hardship of
this magnitude should not be ignored by labeling it "economic."
The Supreme Court's Wang decision ended a trend toward al-
lowing serious economic hardship as a basis by itself for suspen-
sion eligibility.78 The Ninth Circuit Court had stated:
We need not hold that either the Wangs' showing regarding their chil-
dren or the Wangs' anticipated economic setback alone constitutes a
prima facie case of extreme hardship.... We do not preclude the possi-
bility that upon further examination the Board, in the sound exercise of
its discretion, may find that either hardship alone is extreme and warrants
relief or that both combined are hardships sufficient to warrant relief.79
In reversing the Ninth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court com-
mented "that a mere showing of economic detriment is not suffi-
medical problems, see Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir. 1979); age of United
States citizen child and the effect of deportation on the child's education, see Jong
Shik Choe v. INS, 597 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1979); Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577
F.2d 589, 595 n.5 (9th Cir. 1978); separation of family members, see Jong Shik Choe
v. INS, 597 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1979); Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589,
593-95 (9th Cir. 1978); Yong v. INS, 459 F.2d 1004, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972); and the emo-
tional and economic impact of moving to another country, see Jong Shik Choe v.
INS, 597 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1979); Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589, 595
(9th Cir. 1978). Many of these factors may be accorded far less weight in the fu-
ture because of the Wang decision.
73. Section 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
74. See In re S, 5 I. & N. Dec. 409 (1953).
75. See Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Ching, 12 L & N.
Dec. 710 (1968); In re Louie, 10 I. & N. Dec. 223 (1963) is particularly interesting
since the BIA relied almost exclusively on economic factors in granting suspen-
sion.
76. Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 1968); M. IVENER & S. BLALOCK,
HANDBOOK OF IIGRATION LAw 256 (1980). In INS v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027 (1981)
the Court noted that "there [was] nothing to suggest that the college-educated
male respondent could not find suitable employment in Korea." Id. at 1030.
77. See Carnalla-Munoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980); Llacer v. INS, 388
F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1968).
78. Even if Wang applies only to motions to reopen, the Court's attitude to-
ward economic hardships is clear. Such hardships are to be given little weight in
the future.
79. Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd per curiam, 101 S. Ct.
1027 (1981).
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cient to establish extreme hardship under the Act."80 This
holding ignores the fact that economic hardship often leads to
emotional hardship. The inability to afford health care or higher
education may have an emotional impact on aliens who are accus-
tomed to life in America. Immigration lawyers should attempt to
express economic hardships in terms of their emotional impact.
An emotional impact analysis may be a means to circumvent the
Court's skepticism toward economic hardship.
The Ninth and Third Circuits have split over one question relat-
ing to economic hardship. The disagreement concerns whether
an alien's dependence on welfare should be a negative factor in
determining if suspension should be granted.8 1 In a Ninth Circuit
case, Nee Hao Wong v. INS,82 an alien was denied suspension in
part because he was a "charge on the people of the State of Cali-
fornia while he was hospitalized... [and] his complete depen-
dency on welfare assistance which was anticipated to continue
into the indefinite future ....
In So Chun Chung v. INS,84 the Third Circuit took the opposite
approach:
When reviewing a § 244 petition the Immigration and Naturalization
Service may consider several factors in adjudging the hardship claimed by
a petitioner. The financial position of a family-including the sources of
its income-is obviously relevant in this regard. It is important, however,
only insofar as it bears on the hardship that deportation would work on
either the alien or the family. If, on the other hand, the alien's former de-
pendence on public assistance is relied upon in denying a § 244 petition on
80. INS v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027, 1030-31 (1981). It is unfortunate that the Ninth
Circuit chose the fact situation in Wang to develop a new approach to economic
hardship. The Wangs owned a business valued at $75,000 which provided a weekly
income of $650. They also had $24,000 saved and miscellaneous assets worth
$20,000. The adult members of the Wang family were well educated. The Wangs'
ability to support themselves if deported to Korea cannot be seriously questioned.
The Ninth Circuit should have waited for a case such as Santana-Figueroa v. INS,
No. 79-7691, (9th Cir. May 11, 1981). In Santana-Figueroa, an uneducated and un-
skilled 70 year-old citizen of Mexico faced deportation. The court noted that the
alien faced malnutrition or starvation if deported. Id. It is unlikely that a finding
of extreme hardship, even though purely economic, would be reversed in such a
case.
81. The Wang decision did not address this issue. The Wangs were not on
welfare.
82. 550 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1977). This case is also an excellent example of how
an alien may satisfy all the eligibility requirements for suspension and still not be
granted relief.
83. Id. at 524.
84. 602 F.2d 608 (3d Cir. 1979).
the theory that those who have received public assistance are in some
way less desirable than other aliens, we believe it is improper.
8 5
So Chun Chung is the better reasoned decision, considering the
requirements of section 244. Nowhere in the text or legislative
history of section 244 is hardship to a state mentioned. The em-
phasis is entirely on hardship to the alien or his immediate rela-
tives.86 It has been stated that "[tIhe absence of additional
equities militates against the grant of suspension of deporta-
tion."87 But dependence on welfare does not preclude substantial
equities favoring suspension. An alien may be on welfare due to
lack of job skills. He is even more likely to suffer extreme hard-
ship on deportation than an alien who has learned a successful
trade while working here.
One recent Third Circuit decision, Bastidas v. INS,88 offers
great potential for extending the range of emotional hardships
considered in determining "extreme hardship." Here a deport-
able alien father faced permanent separation from his son. The
Third Circuit court reversed a finding of ineligibility for suspen-
sion. The immigration judge's failure to consider the "foreseeable
emotional impact" of the separation was cited as error.89 Since
the Wang decision is silent on the question of emotional hard-
ships, Bastidas is presumably still viable precedent.90 Immigra-
tion defense lawyers can utilize Bastidas to add a new dimension
to a client's potential hardship if deported. Separation from a life-
long friend or loss of a position in a community organization may
be hardship with a foreseeable emotional impact.
Hardship, both economic and emotional, to an alien's immedi-
ate family is of crucial importance in obtaining suspension. The
absence of immediate relatives in the United States may indicate
a lack of roots in this country and a lower degree of hardship if
deported.91 The existence of immediate relatives in an alien's
home country may decrease his chances for suspension.92 This is
85. Id. at 611. Cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (barring discrimi-
nation against aliens in allotting public welfare benefits).
86. See L & N. Act, § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
87. Asikese v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
88. 609 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1979).
89. Id. at 104.
90. In fact, Bastidas is cited as authority in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 101 S. Ct.
1027, 1029 n.2 (1981). Furthermore, Bastidas was an appeal from a finding of ineli-
gibility, not a motion to reopen.
91. Melachrinos v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 42, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See, e.g., Nee Hao
Wong v. INS, 550 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1977); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.
1968); Llacer v. INS, 388 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1968); Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th
Cir. 1960); In re S, 5 L & N. Dec. 695 (1954).
92. See, e.g., Vichos v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Asikese v. Brown-
ell, 230 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Leontis v. Esperdy, 175 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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true even if an alien uses his earnings here to support his family
abroad.93
The court's focus on immediate relatives in the United States
has led to inequitable consequences. In Kam Ng v. Pilliod,94 an
alien with seventeen years residence was denied suspension be-
cause he lacked family ties in this country. In decisions like Kam
Ng, the courts overlook the fact that section 244(a) places equal
emphasis on the hardship to the alien himself. Under section
244(a), hardship "to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child" is
disjunctive. An alien need only establish extreme hardship to one
of the persons mentioned. 95
Among the family hardships traditionally recognized, hardship
to United States citizen children of aliens is the most important
factor in obtaining suspension. United States citizen children are
normally forced to leave the country when their alien parents are
deported. Yet courts have rejected the claim that deportation of
alien parents amounts to an unconstitutional de facto deportation
of their citizen children.96 Banks v. INS,97 is an excellent exam-
ple of indifference to hardships of citizen children. In Banks, a
ten year old United States citizen child faced the prospect of mov-
ing to Germany with her deportable alien mother. The child, who
suffered from a hearing problem, required medical attention not
easily available in Germany. In addition, the child could not
speak German. The court found that the hardship to the child did
not warrant a grant of suspension to the mother.98
A United States citizen child may face serious problems in his
93. See Vichos v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
94. 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960).
95. The fact aliens with no immediate relatives in the United States may expe-
rience great hardships if deported has long been accepted. This was why the
Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, § 20(c), 54 Stat. 672 (1940) was amended in 1948 to
allow suspension for aliens without regard to immediate relatives. Act of July 1,
1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206 (1948). See S. REP. No. 1204, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1948);
2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9a, at 7-130
(rev. ed. 1980). The reasoning behind the 1948 amendment probably influenced
Congress to adopt the disjunctive wording in the present statute.
96. Rubio de Cachu v. INS, 568 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1977); Davidson v. INS, 558
F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977); Lee v. INS, 550 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977); Gonzalez-Cuevas
v. INS, 515 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1975).
97. 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979).
98. The Banks court reasoned: "We believe that this case falls with the gen-
eral rule which does not allow an alien, illegally within this country, to gain a fa-
vored status on the coattails of his (or her) child who happens to have been born
in this country." Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir. 1979). Such reasoning
often accompanied the classic "floodgate" argument.
deported parent's home country. Dissenting in In re Kim,99 Mau-
rice Roberts (then Chairman of the BIA) stated: "Depending on
the circumstances prevailing in the foreign country, the child may
be deprived of the educational and economic opportunities, the
health services and other benefits readily available to him in this
country. He may be deprived of the great democratic freedoms
which are ours."100 The difficulties continue if the child eventu-
ally decides to return to the United States. He may be separated
permanently from his parents if they are unable to return for eco-
nomic or legal reasons. 0 1 Having grown up with a different cul-
ture and language, he may be treated as a foreigner here in the
country of his birth.102
The hardship a child experiences in moving to another country
obviously increases with age. The single most important factor in
this increasing hardship is the child's dependence on English.
Once a child has reached school age, changing languages may se-
riously retard his scholastic progress. 0 3 Inability to freely con-
verse with his classmates may alienate him socially. Of course,
some consideration must be given to the hardship of preschool
children. Loss of the advantages of living in America will be a
hardship to children of any age. But there is a hidden danger in
the courts giving great weight to hardships of younger children.
Legislators may become fearful that aliens will have children in
order to obtain suspension.10 4 New restrictive amendments to
section 244 could put an end to any possibility of liberalizing sus-
pension relief. By placing greater emphasis on hardship to
school age children, there is less cause for concern that suspen-
sion will be abused. Little immediate advantage is obtained in
giving birth to a child. Children become an important factor in
obtaining suspension only upon entering school. It is highly un-
99. 15 .& N. Dec. 88 (1974).
100. Id. at 92.
101. Deported aliens are permanently prohibited from reentering the United
States unless the Attorney General grants special permission to return. C.
GORDON & E. GORDON, IMmiGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.6c, at 4-15 (desk ed.
1980).
102. See In re Kim, 15 L & N. Dec. 88, 91-94 (1974) (Roberts, Chairman of BIA,
dissenting).
103. In Jong Ha Wang the Court stated that "the Board [of Immigration Ap-
pealsI could not believe that the two 'young children of affluent, educated parents'
would be subject to such educational deprivations in Korea as to amount to ex-
treme hardship. In making these determinations, the Board was acting within its
authority." INS v. Wang, 101 S. Ct. 1027, 1031 (1981). The Wangs had two children,
ages ten and seven at the time of trial in the court of appeals. Neither child could
speak Korean. The Supreme Court focused solely on the parents ability to pay for
education in Korea and completely ignored the potential emotional hardships.
104. This was one of the concerns that led to adoption of the restrictive McCar-
ran-Walter Act. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 601 (1950).
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likely that an undocumented alien will plan five or six years in ad-
vance to have a child in order to fulfill the extreme hardship
requirement for suspension.
Hardships to relatives not mentioned in section 244(a) have
been considered recently. The Third Circuit has adopted an anal-
ysis which broadens the classes of relatives covered under section
244(a). In Tovar v. INS,105 a deportation order was reversed be-
cause hardship to an alien's grandchild, a United States citizen,
had not been considered. A grandchild is not a statutorily defined
relative in section 244. Normally, hardship to a grandchild would
be irrelevant. The Tovar court, however, found that the grand-
mother had acted as a surrogate mother since the grandchild's in-
fancy. Because "[t]he language of the suspension provision
evinces a legislative purpose to protect immediate members of an
alien's family from the hardship attending her deportation," the
hardship to the grandchild must be considered.3o6 Future cases
involving "surrogate" relationships may be able to utilize lan-
guage in Tovar that the grandchild was "emotionally attached and
financially dependent" on the grandmother.107 For example, un-
cles, aunts, cousins or guardians of citizens may be able to meet
the emotionally attached-financially dependent criteria.108
There is an alternative approach that can be used to expand the
classes of relatives considered under section 244(a). The hard-
ship to non-immediate relatives can be expressed in terms of
hardship to the deportable alien himself. This approach is consis-
tent with the wording of section 244. The Third Circuit's reinter-
pretation of the words "spouse," "parent" and "child" is more of
an intrusion on the statutory language. The Tovar approach
105. 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 797. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (grand-
mother included in statutory definition of "family"); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 220
n.9 (1966) (statutory intent to unite families of aliens deportable because of fraud
in obtaining visa); H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1957).
107. See Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1979) where the court stated that
"the existing case law uniformly emphasizes the importance of the question of the
separation of family members from each other for the purposes of a § 244(a) (1)
extreme hardship determination." Id. at 105. Cf. Vergel v. INS, 536 F.2d 755 (8th
Cir. 1976) (child's separation from life-long nurse).
108. But see In re All, File A22164629 (filed May 30, 1978), where the BIA held
that hardship to an alien's paramour and illegitimate daughter could not be con-
sidered in determining the alien's eligibility for relief. They did not qualify as
spouse and child under section 244.
should not be discounted, but it is vulnerable to reversal by the
Supreme Court.
Decisions such as Tovar and Bastidas offer new opportunities
for suspension of deportation relief. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court's Wang decision will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on
the liberalization of suspension relief by the courts. Furthermore,
the extent to which the courts may further develop the law is lim-
ited by their role as judicial, not legislative, entities. The judiciary
will not be able to address many of the weaknesses in section
244(a).
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
There are compelling reasons for legislative amendment of sec-
tion 244(a). The widespread criticism and call for change of sec-
tion 244(a) was best summarized in a 1953 report by the
President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization which
stated:
[TJhe authorities administering the law should have sufficient discretion
to enable them to take humanitarian considerations into account. These
resident aliens about whom we are talking may have lived in this country
for years, may have married spouses who are American citizens, and may
have children who are American citizens. Deportation of the alien may
mean intolerable hardship for the family. The officials enforcing the laws
should therefore have authority to look at the whole picture .... 109
The Attorney General's authority must be expanded to allow for
greater consideration of economic and emotional hardships. Dis-
cretion to withhold relief, however, must be limited to prevent de-
nial of suspension in deserving cases.110 These goals can be
accomplished by liberalizing the hardship standard and adopting
guidelines for determining eligibility and granting relief under
section 244(a).
The legislative amendments to be proposed in this article may
appear to be a step backward toward the Alien Registration Act of
1940.111 To a degree, this is correct. Yet forty years of experience
have shown that the "serious economic detriment" standard of
the Act, without any requirement of residency, was overly broad.
A compromise between the 1940 and 1952 Acts would avoid the
drawbacks of both extremes.
A new hardship standard---"unusual economic or emotional
hardship"--should be adopted. This standard would apply to all
grounds of deportation. The continuous physical presence re-
109. PRESIDENT'S COrmMSSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALZATION, WHOM WE
SHALL WELCOME 213 (1953).
110. See Note, 60 YALE L REV. 152, 155 (1951).
111. Ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 672 (1940) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976)).
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quirement for both subsections of section 244 would be retained,
and would be sufficient to distinguish deportable misconduct from
severe deportable misconduct. A new subsection should be ad-
ded with the following provisions:
(1) Any one of the following factors constitutes a prima facie showing of
unusual economic or emotional hardship: (a) existence of a United States
citizen child over six years of age residing with the deportable alien; (b)
probability of long-term separation from spouse, parent or child as the re-
sult of deportation; (c) demonstrated inability to obtain employment in
native country adequate to support the alien or his family (d) continuous
physical presence for a period substantially longer than the statutory re-
quirement in section 244(a); (e) loss of substantial business investment or
inability to practice a learned profession as the result of deportation; and
(f) any additional humanitarian considerations the Attorney General
finds, in his discretion, to be unusual economic or emotional hardship (2)
Aliens establishing a prima facie case of hardship and meeting the other
requirements of this section shall be entitled to a full hearing on eligibility
and equities for relief; (3) The above factors shall also serve as a guideline
in determining whether relief should be granted. A written opinion dis-
cussing these guidelines and any other relevant considerations for grant-
ing or denying relief shall be issued after each full hearing.
The "unusual economic or emotional hardship" standard in the
proposed statute was selected for several reasons. The adjective
"unusual" connotes a lower degree than "extreme";1' 2 more aliens
will be eligible for relief. The phrase is disjunctive allowing aliens
with solely economic hardship to be eligible for suspension. The
new hardship standard would not be a complete return to the lib-
erality of the Alien Registration Act, because the continuous
physical presence requirements of the Immigration and National-
ity Act are retained. The unusual economic or emotional hard-
ship standard would require more than mere inconvenience when
an alien is deported. The hardship must threaten the reasonable
well-being of an alien or his family. Thus, cases of doubtful merit
will not justify a grant of suspension under the proposed stan-
dard.
The proposed guidelines serve several functions and cover a
range of serious hardships deserving special consideration. Incor-
poration of the guidelines into federal law would ensure that sig-
nificant hardships are treated uniformly throughout the nation.
The guidelines would also serve to limit discretion in several
ways. They provide certain contingencies where the Attorney
General must grant a full hearing on statutory eligibility and is-
sue an opinion discussing his findings on specific guidelines.
112. See HR. REP. No. 94-506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1975).
Under the present law, the Attorney General can issue a cursory
opinion ignoring salient hardships. Professor Kenneth Culp Da-
vis has stated that "[a] main way to structure discretion is
through stating findings and reasons and following prece-
dents .... When findings, reasons, and precedents are open to
the public, including present and potential parties, the agency's
discretion may be largely controlled by the pressure for establish-
ing a system and adhering to it."113
During a full hearing on eligibility requirements, the Attorney
General must examine the alien's history and determine how
many of the factors in the guideline are met. An alien who satis-
fies one or more elements of the guideline may still be denied re-
lief. The hearing and the opinion are the only provisions of the
proposed statute that are mandatory. With a detailed opinion
from the Attorney General, however, an alien denied suspension
will have the opportunity for a meaningful review of the decision.
The BIA and the circuit courts will be able to judge if proper con-
sideration was given to each requirement for suspension. Effec-
tive review will undoubtedly discourage arbitrary decisions by the
Attorney General.
One common objection to liberalization of suspension of depor-
tation relief must be addressed. Some legislators and judges have
expressed a fear that expanding suspension relief will result in a
veritable flood of undocumented aliens. receiving suspension."l4
This very fear led to the adoption of the harsh "exceptional and
extremely unusual" hardship standard in 1952.115 The floodgate
argument is often invoked to reject summarily any consideration
of economic hardship. Such hardship, it is argued, is encountered
by all aliens who are deported to countries with lower standards
of living.
The legislative amendments proposed here will not lead to a
deluge of alien immigration. Regardless of any change in the
hardship standard, section 244(a) would still require that an alien
have at least seven years continuous physical presence in the
United States. This substantially limits an illegal alien's ability to
avoid the immigration laws. In Wadman v. INS,116 the court com-
mented that a "liberal construction [of section 244(a) ] would not
open the door to suspension of deportation in cases of doubtful
merit. It would simply tend to increase the scope of the Attorney
113. 2 K. DAvis, ADMimSTRAT=V LAW TREATISE § 8.4 at 169 (2d ed. 1979).
114. See, e.g., Wang, 622 F.2d 1341, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Goodwin,
Circuit Judge, dissenting), rev'd per curiam, 101 S. Ct. 1027 (1981); S. REP. No. 1137
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952); S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 600-01 (1950).
115. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 600-01 (1950).
116. 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
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General's review and thus his power to act in amelioration of
hardship."u 7 The same reasoning applies to the proposed legisla-
tive amendments. The "unusual economic or emotional " hard-
ship standard would significantly expand the classes of aliens
eligible for relief, and the proposed guidelines would only limit
the Attorney General's discretion in circumstances strongly mer-
iting relief.
CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court's recent Wang decision will have a chilling
effect on expansion of suspension relief. Any liberalization of the
widely criticized extreme hardship standard will have to come
from Congress. The proposed "unusual economic or emotional
hardship" standard is a more equitable approach to suspension of
deportation relief. This new standard in combination with guide-
lines for determining eligibility and granting relief provide a rea-
sonable means to review the Attorney General's exercise of
discretion. The time has arrived when aliens who face something
less than extreme hardship should be allowed to make their home
in the United States.
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